Reynolds v Abel Estate Agent clarifies early conciliation requirements for tribunal amendments

Court of Appeal confirms section 18A does not apply to applications to amend existing claims
The Court of Appeal has provided significant clarification on the scope of early conciliation requirements in employment tribunal proceedings, determining that section 18A of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 applies only to the initial institution of proceedings and not to subsequent applications to amend.
In Reynolds v Abel Estate Agent Ltd & Ors [2025] EWCA Civ 1357, the appellant employers challenged an employment tribunal's decision to grant the claimant permission to amend her claim form to include a detriment claim, arguing that the claimant had failed to obtain an early conciliation certificate (ECC) specifically for that claim. The appeal raised a fundamental question about whether the mandatory early conciliation provisions extend beyond the original presentation of a complaint.
Sir Nicholas Underhill, giving the leading judgement with which Snowden LJ and Falk LJ agreed, firmly rejected the appellants' construction of section 18A. The statutory language requires a "prospective" claimant to "present an application to institute relevant proceedings", which the Court held naturally connotes the initiation of a distinct process defined by a claim form and responses to it. An application to amend existing proceedings, including by introducing fresh claims or joining new parties, would not typically be described as the institution of proceedings.
This interpretation aligns with the statutory purpose underlying the early conciliation regime. Whilst requiring an opportunity for conciliation before any resort to the tribunal serves a clear policy objective, the position differs materially once proceedings have commenced. At that stage, early conciliation will already have been attempted without success. Complex cases may involve multiple applications to introduce fresh claims or join additional parties at various stages of proceedings, and imposing a requirement to invoke early conciliation on each occasion would prove both impractical and futile.
The Court expressly approved the reasoning in Science Warehouse Ltd v Khan and Drake v Secretary of State for Justice, rejecting the appellants' attempts to distinguish those authorities. The fact that early conciliation had not been invoked at all in relation to the detriment claim—rather than having been invoked for a different claim or respondent—made no difference to the construction question at issue.
Having determined that section 18A does not apply to amendments, the Court held there was no error of principle in granting permission to amend. The absence of prior early conciliation may constitute a relevant factor in exercising the tribunal's discretion, but cannot be determinative. Employment Judge Crosfill's exercise of discretion was upheld, with particular weight given to the venial nature of the claimant's failure given the tight timetable, and the intimate connection between the detriment claim and the existing unfair dismissal claim.
The judgement draws a useful parallel with established principles governing time limits. Permission may be granted to add claims or join respondents in employment tribunal proceedings notwithstanding that a fresh claim would be out of time. Where a new claim closely connects with matters already in issue, the jurisdictional bar operates differently than it would for wholly distinct fresh proceedings. This principle, rooted in the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly, extends logically to early conciliation requirements.
The decision provides welcome clarity for tribunal practitioners on a question that had generated some uncertainty. Whilst claimants remain obliged to comply strictly with early conciliation requirements when instituting proceedings, the judgement confirms that amendments introducing related claims or parties need not restart the early conciliation process. The tribunal's case management powers remain sufficiently flexible to address any potential prejudice through the discretionary framework governing amendments, rather than through rigid jurisdictional bars that would undermine efficiency and proportionality in tribunal proceedings.
