R v Mahek Bukhari: Court of Appeal grants leave on unlawful act manslaughter base offence

The Court of Appeal has granted leave to appeal in R v Mahek Bukhari & Ors [2025] EWCA Crim 1353, raising significant questions about the identification of base offences in unlawful act manslaughter prosecutions involving secondary parties.

Eight defendants faced re-trial at Leicester Crown Court between June and August 2023 for the murder or manslaughter of Saqib Hussain and Mohammed Hashim Ijazuddin. The jury convicted four defendants—Ansreen Bukhari, her daughter Mahek Bukhari, Raees Jamal, and Rekan Karwan—of murder, imposing mandatory life sentences with minimum terms ranging from 26 years 9 months to 31 years 8 months. Three others—Ameer Jamal, Sanaf Gulammustafa, and Natasha Akhtar—were convicted of manslaughter and received sentences between 12 and 15 years' imprisonment. Mohammed Patel was acquitted.

The three manslaughter appellants pursued three grounds of appeal. The first challenged the route to verdict as legally defective. Question 10 in the jury directions provided three alternate routes to conviction for secondary participation in unlawful act manslaughter, when established authority in R v Jogee permits only one: intentional assistance or encouragement of the principal to commit the crime. More fundamentally, the route to verdict failed to identify the base offence and posed no questions regarding the mental element of that offence.

Lord Justice Warby, sitting with Mr Justice Lavender and Her Honour Judge de Bertodano, found this ground arguable and meriting a full appeal hearing. The court noted that unlawful act manslaughter remains a notoriously troublesome area. At trial, the Crown Court Compendium stated it was "desirable" to specify the base offence. Following R v Grey (Auriol) [2024] EWCA Crim 487, the 2025 Compendium now declares it "vital" to identify and prove a base crime, with failure resulting in unsafe conviction.

The court emphasised that this reasoning must apply equally in secondary party cases. A defendant cannot be guilty of manslaughter as a secondary party unless they were party to an agreement to commit, or assisted or encouraged the commission of, a criminal offence. Agreeing to join conduct that is obviously dangerous is insufficient.

The second ground contended the judge wrongly dismissed no case submissions. The appellants, all travelling in the Seat vehicle, had given unchallenged evidence that they called on Raees Jamal to stop during the car chase. The court rejected this argument, finding ample evidence—both direct and circumstantial—from which a jury could conclude each appellant became and remained party to a joint enterprise to cause at least some harm to the Skoda's occupants.

The third ground alleged the convictions were perverse given Mohammed Patel's acquittal despite ostensibly stronger evidence against him. The court dismissed this ground, noting material distinctions between the cases and the jury's proper function in assessing credibility.

The court granted leave to appeal on ground one alone, ordering skeleton arguments and directing counsel to address which base offences could be relied upon and whether proving actual impact—as opposed to conduct causing the Skoda to leave the road—was essential.

The appellants also challenged their sentences. The judge had placed their culpability in category B of the manslaughter guideline, citing the high risk of death or grievous bodily harm that should have been obvious. The appellants argued their attempts to dissuade Raees Jamal should have been treated as mitigation rather than evidence against them, and that sentences of 12-15 years were manifestly excessive for individuals guilty through presence alone, albeit voluntary and supportive.

The Court of Appeal accepted that whilst the car chase undoubtedly carried high risk, each appellant played a minor role—a category D factor requiring powerful downward impact on sentencing. The court found the judge erred in balancing aggravation and mitigation, and that the sentences were manifestly excessive. Reduced sentences were substituted: Ameer Jamal received 12 years 8 months, Gulammustafa 12 years 9 months, and Natasha Akhtar 9 years 8 months.

The case underscores the critical importance of properly identifying base offences in unlawful act manslaughter prosecutions and the need for nuanced sentencing that reflects individual culpability, particularly in cases involving secondary participation in dangerous joint enterprises.