Nirav Modi extradition: High Court refuses to reopen appeal after India gives interrogation assurances

The Divisional Court has refused Nirav Modi permission to reopen his extradition appeal, concluding that assurances provided by the Government of India between September 2025 and February 2026 are sufficiently comprehensive and reliable to address his Article 3 concerns. The judgement, handed down on 25 March 2026 by Lord Justice Stuart-Smith and Mr Justice Jay, marks the latest chapter in proceedings that began with Modi's arrest in England in March 2019.

Modi, whose extradition to India is sought in connection with an alleged fraud on the Punjab National Bank causing losses exceeding £700 million and the subsequent laundering of those proceeds, had applied under CrimPR 50.27 to reopen the court's November 2022 judgement dismissing his appeal. The basis was this court's February 2025 decision in Bhandari v Government of India [2025] EWHC 449 (Admin), which characterised the use of proscribed treatment by Indian investigative authorities to obtain confessions as "commonplace and endemic". Modi argued that this finding, which post-dated the original appeal, demonstrated an unacceptable risk of torture or ill-treatment were he to be returned.

The court accepted that genuine parallels existed between Bhandari and Modi's circumstances — notably the finding that both men were, or would be perceived as, wealthy individuals at heightened risk. The Government of India did not seek to challenge the systemic findings in Bhandari, resting its case instead on the quality of the assurances it had since provided.

Those assurances, culminating in a note verbale from the Indian High Commission dated 12 February 2026, gave categorical commitments that Modi would not be interrogated by any of five named investigating agencies — the CBI, the ED, the SFIO, the DRI and the CBDT — either in connection with the extradition offences or any other proceedings. Any future interrogation would require prior consent from UK courts or authorities. The Ministry of Home Affairs confirmed that all five agencies had provided written confirmations, and that the assurances were binding on and enforceable against each of them.

Applying the Othman v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 1 framework, the court found the assurances to be specific rather than general, given by an official competent to bind the Indian state, and extending to all relevant executive agencies. The court noted the long history of bilateral relations between the United Kingdom and India, and concluded that any breach would carry severe diplomatic consequences given the profile of the case — itself a reason the assurances were likely to be scrupulously observed.

The court distinguished the present case from Bhandari on the quality of the assurances: whereas that case involved an unnamed "investigation agency" and an imprecisely worded undertaking, Modi's assurances were granular and identified each relevant body by name. The court held this was a fortiori the position considered in Bhandari at paragraph 132. It also declined to require disclosure of internal governmental correspondence between the Ministry of Home Affairs and individual agencies, finding no such obligation arose from any duty of candour.

Subsidiary arguments advanced on Modi's behalf — including that the doctrine of specialty under section 21 of the Indian Extradition Act does not extend to interrogation, that the video-conferencing facilities at Arthur Road Prison were inadequate, and that a production warrant issued by the Surat court in Gujarat created a concrete risk of transfer and subsequent questioning — were each addressed and rejected. The court found that even if Modi were produced before the Gujarat court, the DRI remained bound by the assurances. The possibility that the carve-out allowing UK consent to future interrogation was legally inoperable under section 129 of the Extradition Act 2003 operated in the Government of India's favour: if the condition precedent to interrogation could not be fulfilled, interrogation could not lawfully occur.

The application for permission to reopen was refused. The court held that reopening was neither necessary to avoid real injustice nor warranted by exceptional circumstances.

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