How the amended English Arbitration Act puts London at the centre of global arbitration reform

International arbitration is a method of resolving international disputes outside of national courts, through a neutral, private tribunal whose award is legally binding and enforceable.  The “seat” of an arbitration, which is usually specified in the parties’ arbitration agreement, determines which national courts have supervisory authority over the proceedings and whose national arbitration law governs the arbitral process. 

Until recently, arbitration proceedings seated in England, Wales and Northern Ireland were governed by the Arbitration Act 1996 (the AA 1996). However, as of 1 August 2025, new legislation – the Arbitration Act 2025 (the AA 2025) – has come into effect. The AA 2025 supplements and amends the existing arbitral framework under the AA 1996.

The AA 2025 implements a number of significant new measures, with the purpose of making London-seated international arbitrations more user-friendly and to align the UK with global procedural best practice.  

This article focusses on key elements of the AA 2025 in the context of the wider global debate over arbitral reform – particularly, provisions concerning: summary dismissal; emergency arbitration; arbitrators’ disclosure duties; and the governing law of an arbitration agreement.

Summary Dismissal

The AA 2025 now provides arbitral tribunals with an express power to issue summary awards in relation to claims or defences which the tribunal considers have no real prospect of success. This new express power applies the same threshold as the summary dismissal procedure available in English court litigation under CPR 24. 

This amendment reflects a global shift towards increased availability of procedures for early determination of disputes. Such procedures are commonly perceived to improve efficiency of arbitration proceedings. In recent years, most major arbitration institutions have incorporated a summary dismissal or early determination mechanism into their arbitration rules, including the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC), and Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC). Both the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and UNCITRAL have published guidance notes to similar effect.

Nonetheless, despite the apparent consensus amongst arbitral institutions that tribunals should be empowered to grant the early determination of disputes, these procedures are under-used.  In 2024, the LCIA received early determination applications in only 5% of administered cases; both SIAC and the HKIAC received summary dismissal applications in less than 1% of administered cases.

One explanation is a perceived tension between the tribunal’s power to issue a summary award and a party’s right to have its case heard. Parties often harbour concerns that an early dismissal could create an enforcement risk on the basis that the tribunal inappropriately prejudged the issues in dispute; tribunals are mindful of potential challenge applications on similar grounds. There is also generally a high threshold for summary dismissal – most arbitral institutions require a claim to be “manifestly without merit” (or a similar form of wording). Parties may therefore assume there is a high chance an application will be rejected and decide to avoid incurring the cost of bringing any such application in the first place. 

The AA 2025 goes some way to addressing these issues. Expressly granting tribunals summary dismissal powers may help dispel due process concerns. Additionally, the AA 2025 sets a default threshold which aligns with the CPR 24 standard – i.e. “no real prospect of success.” Parties and tribunals may therefore benefit from clarity as to how this standard has been applied by the English courts – albeit, where parties submit summary dismissal applications following institutional rules, the higher threshold may still apply. 

Going forward, it is anticipated that parties will make more frequent use of summary dismissal applications under the AA 2025, leading to greater efficiency in the resolution of London-seated international arbitration proceedings.

Emergency Arbitration

Emergency arbitration provides a streamlined process for parties to seek interim relief – such as injunctions or evidence-preservation orders – from an emergency arbitrator before an arbitral tribunal has been formally constituted. This streamlined process is a procedural innovation, pioneered by the arbitral institutions, which ensures that urgent protective steps can be taken without waiting for the full tribunal to be in place.

The AA 1996 does not address emergency arbitration – understandably, given the procedure did not exist in 1996. However, the AA 2025 introduces a new section 44A, which empowers emergency arbitrators in UK-seated arbitrations to issue peremptory orders and make relevant applications for court orders in support of peremptory orders.

These updates align with the growing popularity of emergency arbitration. Many arbitral institutions have developed bespoke emergency arbitration rules, or else offer specific provisions governing interim measures. Those institutions report increased popularity of emergency arbitration: the ICC has reported a surge in emergency arbitration cases from 20 in 2022 to 33 in 2024; SIAC has reported a similar increase from 12 cases in 2022 to 21 in 2024.  

Broadly, emergency arbitration is a mechanism best-administered by arbitral institutions – not the courts. Any emergency arbitration order will be ultimately reviewed by the arbitral tribunal (once appointed) which is subject to the full scope of applicable national legislation. 

Nonetheless, additional support from national courts may be required where an interim order made by an emergency arbitrator is ignored by an arbitral party. Some popular arbitration jurisdictions – particularly civil law jurisdictions – already address this issue in national legislation. Singapore is also considering updating its International Arbitration Act to include, inter alia, new provisions addressing emergency arbitration (in similar terms to the AA 2025); the proposed amendments to the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 also include new provisions confirming the enforceability of emergency arbitration awards. 

The emergency arbitrator amendment in the AA 2025 aligns English legislation with the best practice approach in other jurisdictions and confirms that the English courts will enforce emergency arbitration orders as required. In practice, this reduces the risk that courts will refuse to enforce emergency arbitrator orders on jurisdictional grounds and should encourage the increased use of peremptory orders in emergency arbitration proceedings seated in England and Wales. 

Arbitrator Duties of Disclosure

Impartiality is a “cardinal duty” of an arbitrator, as per Halliburton Company (Appellant) v Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd [2020] UKSC 48, at para. 49, per Lord Hodge. An important element of an arbitrator’s duty of impartiality is the corresponding duty of disclosure. The UK Supreme Court addressed the scope of this duty in detail in Halliburton v Chubb (2020) and established an objective standard for establishing apparent bias – namely “whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased.” 

The AA 2025 codifies this objective standard by introducing a new requirement that arbitrators disclose “circumstances that might reasonably give rise to justifiable doubts as to the individual’s impartiality in relation to the proceedings, or potential proceedings, concerned.” This legislative update goes hand-in-hand with broader international efforts to ensure proper disclosure. Indeed, in Halliburton v Chubb (2020), the Supreme Court expressly considered intervening representations from arbitral institutions as to the internationally accepted standards and practices for arbitrator impartiality. 

Unlike in the AA 2025, other institutional rules and guidelines more commonly adopt a subjective standard for arbitrator disclosure, which considers the parties’ perception of relevant facts. For example, in the IBA Guidelines, the duty of disclosure is triggered by the existence of facts and circumstances “that may, in the eyes of the parties, give rise to doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence.” However, the English court has confirmed that, in applying the English law objective test, it will take into account the views of arbitral institutions. For example, in Aiteo v Shell (2024), the High Court considered the ICC Court’s decision to remove an arbitrator was a relevant factor in assessing whether a fair-minded observer would consider there to be a risk of bias, Aiteo Eastern E & P Company Limited v Shell Western Supply and Trading Limited and others [2024] EWHC 1993, at paras. 183-184, per Mr Justice Jacobs.

The circumstances which give rise to a duty of disclosure remain case-specific under English law. Nonetheless, the codification of an objective test in the AA 2025 provides helpful clarity for tribunals and parties in London-seated proceedings. 

Governing Law of the Arbitration Agreement

An arbitration agreement is treated as an independent agreement that remains effective even if the main contract is invalidated – the so-called “separability doctrine.” Therefore, the governing law of the arbitration agreement is not necessarily the same as the governing law of the parties’ main contract. 

This principle has given rise to lengthy academic debate as to the choice of law principles relevant to determine the governing law of an arbitration agreement. The issue frequently arises in practice because parties often fail to select a specific governing law for their arbitration agreement. National courts, including the UK Supreme Court, have applied various tests to ascertain the governing law with the “closest connection” to the arbitration agreement, as outlined in Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v. OOO Insurance Company Chubb [2020] UKSC 38. This approach created some uncertainty and appeared, to some at least, as leading to counter-intuitive outcomes. For example, in Kabab-ji v Kout Food, the UK Supreme Court considered that English law, which was the governing law of the underlying contract, applied to the parties’ arbitration agreement, even though the parties expressly agreed to Paris-seated arbitration, as per Kabab-Ji SAL v Kout Food Group [2021] UKSC 48. 

Applying English law, the court determined Kout Food had not become party to the arbitration agreement. The French Cour de cassation reached the opposite conclusion and determined that French law applied to the arbitration agreement and, applying French law, Kout Food had become party to the arbitration agreement. 

The AA 2025 expressly clarifies that: (i) the law applicable to arbitration agreements is the law expressly chosen by the parties; (ii) otherwise, it will be the law of the seat of the arbitration; and (iii) an express choice of law to govern the main contract will not constitute an express choice of law to govern the agreement to arbitrate. This reformulates the approach previously taken by the English courts and provides welcome certainty that, where parties choose London-seated arbitration proceedings, their arbitration agreement will be governed by English law – absent an express choice of any alternative law applicable to the arbitration agreement.

There is obvious benefit to commercial parties in gaining clarity on this point. The designated governing law of an arbitration agreement can affect the arbitrability of a dispute, as seen in Anupam Mittal v Westbridge Ventures II Investment Holdings [2023] SGCA 1., but also the parties to a dispute (Kabab-Ji SAL v Kout Food Group) and the validity of the arbitration agreement itself (BNA v BNB [2019] SGCA 84).

Other popular arbitral jurisdictions have yet to take steps to expressly clarify in national arbitration legislation how to determine the governing law of an arbitration agreement. However, Singapore is currently considering revisions to its International Arbitration Act, including on this point, and it is anticipated that other jurisdictions may follow suit.

Conclusion

The AA 2025 implements important reforms, which respond directly to global momentum towards increased efficiency and certainty in international arbitration proceedings. In many ways, the reforms discussed above reflect the position under existing English case law.  However, codifying these measures increases certainty, encourages arbitrators to implement procedures (by expressly stating they have the power to do so), and confirms the degree to which the English courts will support international arbitration proceedings. 

Ultimately, the UK is ahead of other arbitration-friendly jurisdictions in implementing these measures into national legislation and, in doing so, shaping best practice for international arbitration regimes globally. This revised framework sets a legislative benchmark and other jurisdictions will likely follow London’s lead, signaling a global shift towards more user-friendly international arbitration practice.