City of London Corporation v Bussandra: Mental health and intentional homelessness

The Court of Appeal has provided important guidance on the interplay between mental health conditions and intentional homelessness determinations, upholding a review officer's decision that rejected claims of temporary mental aberration.

John Bussandra, 51, exchanged his London accommodation for a Brighton flat in November 2015. Within weeks, he regretted the move and sought to return to London, citing theft of bank cards and alleged antisocial behaviour. He surrendered his tenancy in February 2016, subsequently becoming homeless.

Mr Bussandra had a documented history of recurrent depression, anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive traits. Medical evidence suggested he experienced a major depressive episode when leaving the Brighton property, potentially affecting his decision-making capacity. The City of London Corporation nevertheless concluded he became homeless intentionally under section 191 of the Housing Act 1996.

The legal test for deliberateness

Lord Justice Newey's judgement clarified that "deliberately" in section 191(1) refers only to the relevant act or omission, not to an intention to become homeless. The appellant argued that mental health problems playing a significant role in a decision automatically negated deliberateness. The Court rejected this interpretation.

Whilst outright lack of mental capacity prevents conduct from being deliberate, mental health problems need not reach that threshold. The Homelessness Code of Guidance contemplates that "limited mental capacity" or "temporary aberration or aberrations caused by mental illness" can negate deliberateness, even where capacity remains.

The Court rejected both extremes: deliberateness does not require full contractual capacity, but neither is it automatically negated when mental health significantly influences a decision. Someone experiencing mild depression who chooses not to pay rent cannot simply claim the decision was non-deliberate because mental health played a significant role.

Application to the facts

The review officer, Mr Perdios, applied the correct legal test by reference to the Code. Although he used language about being "unable to rationalise and think clearly", this was in response to medical evidence rather than representing his adopted test. He acknowledged Mr Bussandra's mental health difficulties but concluded the decision stemmed from regret about moving to Brighton rather than mental illness or temporary aberration.

Mr Perdios considered Mr Bussandra's ability to travel extensively during the relevant period, his capacity to articulate his wishes to organisations, and his desire to return to London predating the card theft. These factors supported a finding that the decision was deliberate despite mental health problems.

Adequacy of reasons and equality duty

The Court found Mr Perdios provided adequate reasons for departing from Ms Pisaneschi's medical evidence. Review decisions require benevolent interpretation, and reasons need only address main issues. The review officer devoted substantial space to explaining his disagreement with the clinical assessment, discussing medical reports and Mr Bussandra's demonstrated capabilities in detail.

Regarding the public sector equality duty, the Court rejected claims of mere lip service. Mr Perdios explicitly considered Mr Bussandra's disability status and mental health conditions both when assessing deliberateness and when determining whether continued occupation was reasonable. The substance of the assessment, rather than formulaic recitation, demonstrates compliance.

Implications

This judgement clarifies that mental health conditions affect deliberateness determinations on a spectrum. Review officers must carefully assess whether mental illness or temporary aberration caused the relevant act, but applicants cannot succeed simply by showing mental health significantly influenced their decision. The decision must be causally connected to the mental health condition in a way that negates deliberateness, assessed against Code guidance rather than contractual capacity principles.

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