Ansari v Chief Constable of North Wales Police: when does AF (No. 3) disclosure apply to phone seizures?

In a significant clarification of the AF (No. 3) disclosure standard, the Administrative Court has held that proceedings challenging the seizure and examination of a mobile phone under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 do not engage the irreducible minimum disclosure obligation established in Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No. 3) [2009] UKHL 28.

Fahad Ansari, a solicitor specialising in national security and human rights work — and currently representing Hamas in deproscription proceedings — was stopped at Holyhead Port in August 2025. Officers exercising Schedule 7 powers seized his mobile phone, downloaded its contents and began examining the data. Mr Ansari brought a judicial review challenging the stop, the seizure and the ongoing retention and inspection of the downloaded material. Closed material proceedings were subsequently authorised under the Justice and Security Act 2013.

The central question before Mr Justice Chamberlain was whether, assuming Article 6 ECHR applied, the defendants were required to disclose sufficient gist of the closed case to enable Mr Ansari to disprove allegations made against him — the standard confirmed in AF (No. 3) — or whether the lower statutory threshold (disclosure only to the extent it would not damage national security) governed instead.

The spectrum and where this case falls

Chamberlain J conducted a careful review of the substantial body of case law on this question, from A v United Kingdom (2009) through to the recent judgment of Jay J in R (C3) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 34 (Admin). The case law consistently frames the issue by reference to a spectrum, with detention and asset-freezing cases at one end and employment vetting cases at the other.

Importantly, the judgement takes a firm position against the existence of any meaningful intermediate disclosure standard. Cases such as K, A and B v Secretary of State for Defence [2017] EWHC 830 (Admin) had suggested that a sliding scale of disclosure requirements might operate between the two poles. Chamberlain J respectfully disagreed. The question is binary: either AF (No. 3) applies, in which case the state must disclose the core irreducible minimum of information needed to mount an effective challenge, or it does not, in which case the statutory regime governs and national security considerations prevail. A middle position — requiring some disclosure damaging to national security without reaching the AF (No. 3) threshold — lacks principled justification and creates unworkable uncertainty.

The judgement also rejected a forward/backward-looking distinction between claims, endorsing the Court of Appeal's analysis in R (AZ) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 35. The remedy sought — whether prospective relief or damages — cannot determine the disclosure standard applicable, not least because a defendant could otherwise engineer more favourable treatment simply by releasing a detainee before disclosure fell due.

Search warrants and substantive position

The closest analogous authority was R (Haralambous) v St Albans Crown Court [2018] UKSC 1, in which the Supreme Court held that AF (No. 3) does not apply to challenges to PACE search warrants. Lord Mance's reasoning rested on the short-term nature of the intrusion and, crucially, the fact that a search warrant does not affect the subject's substantive legal position. That position is only engaged if the search gives rise to criminal proceedings, at which point the full range of procedural protections applies.

Chamberlain J held that those principles applied directly. The Schedule 7 seizure imposed no legal obligations on Mr Ansari. The fact that the phone contained potentially privileged material did not alter that analysis: substantial independent safeguards were in place to protect privileged content, and any further use of such material in proceedings would attract the full suite of procedural rights.

The result is that neither defendant is required to make any disclosure damaging to national security interests. The matter will proceed under the standard closed material framework, with the Special Advocate's role providing the principal safeguard for Mr Ansari's procedural rights.

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